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ABSTRACT 
 
Individual Differences in Temporal Perspective May Influence Cognitive Control Strategies 
by  
Chloe Dylan Steindam 
 
Research accumulating over the past 50+ years indicates that individuals who are future-
oriented (FO) make wiser health decisions, have greater academic achievement, and have 
overall higher levels of well-being than individuals who are present- or past-oriented. The 
present study focuses on the cognitive differences in temporal perspective as a trait by 
addressing the hypothesis that high-FO individuals have increased cognitive control as 
compared to low-FO individuals. While a number of studies have examined the traits that 
influence cognitive control strategies—e.g. reward-sensitivity, threat-sensitivity, anxiety—
none have addressed temporal perspective. Using recognition memory decision-making 
strategies as a medium for addressing cognitive control differences, the present study is able 
to address the recognition memory literature on individual differences in criterion shifting as 
well. The first hypothesis was that high-FO participants adopt an overall more conservative 
criterion in a recognition memory test than low-FO participants. The results revealed no 
correlation between temporal orientation and criterion placement. The second hypothesis was 
that high-FO participants will perform better than low-FO participants on the Recent-Probes 
task, a working memory task known to engage a proactive control strategy. No significant 
differences were found due to ceiling effects, therefore it remains unclear whether there is an 
inherent difference between high-FO and low-FO individuals in regards to working memory.
	   1	  
Introduction 
 Research accumulating over the past 50+ years indicates that individuals who are 
future-oriented (FO) make wiser health decisions, have greater academic achievement 
(Cottle, 1969; Goldrich, 1967; Raynor, 1970; De Voider & Lens, 1982), make wiser 
health decisions (Rothspan & Read, 1996; Kees, 2007; Henson, Carey, Carey & Maisto, 
2006; Daughterty & Base, 2010) and have overall higher levels of well-being than 
individuals who are present- or past-oriented (Melges, 1982; Rothspan & Read, 1996; 
Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger & Edwards, 1994; Holman & Silver, 1998). Most research 
on temporal perspective as a personality trait has used social psychological methods to 
examine temporal orientation in relation to physical and mental health behavior. 
However, it is less clear what is going on at the cognitive level. The present study 
explores the possibility that high-FO individuals have increased cognitive control as 
compared to low-FO individuals. The evidence that already exists addresses the link 
between temporal perspective and delayed gratification such that FO individuals are 
better at delaying gratification than present-oriented (Stolarski, Bitner, & Zimbardo, 
2011; Wittman & Paulus, 2008;). While a number of studies have examined the traits that 
influence cognitive control strategies (Braver, 2012)—e.g. reward-sensitivity, threat-
sensitivity, and anxiety—there is a lack of research on the cognitive aspects of temporal 
perspective.  
 Cognitive control strategies have been studied in the context of recognition memory 
decision-making (Miller, Guerin & Wolford, 2011; Aminoff et al., 2012). It has been 
proposed that a key function of memory is to plan future events (Klein, Robertson & 
Delton, 2011). The more accurately one remembers the past, the more effective that 
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person may be in simulating the future. Some of the cognitive processes that may be 
underlying temporal perspective may also be underlying differences in memory decision 
strategies. The link between FO thinking and memory decision strategies is valuable due 
to information we have on the cognitive processes that lead to accurate or false memory 
decisions. It may also shed light on factors that contribute to individual differences in 
criterion placement in recognition memory decision-making, which has important 
implications for the recognition-memory literature, as well as eyewitness testimony and 
any important decisions made based on recognition memory. Higher levels of cognitive 
control have been shown to reduce false alarms (Miller, Guerin &Wolford, 2011). 
Future-orientation may similarly require cognitive control as in delayed gratification. 
 Before discussing the goal of the current study, it important to elaborate on the link 
between temporal perspective, cognitive control, and recognition memory decision-
making strategies. First, I will attempt to establish the link between temporal perspective 
and cognitive control, then I will establish the link between cognitive control and 
recognition memory decision-making strategies. In exploring these links, it should 
become clear that individual differences in temporal perspective has the potential to 
significantly contribute to the literatures on recognition memory decision-making 
strategies and overall cognitive control. 
 
Temporal Perspective and Cognitive Control 
 Braver (2012) defines cognitive control as “the ability to regulate thoughts and 
actions in accordance with internally represented behavioral goals” (p. 106). In this 
review article, Braver provides evidence for the claim that inter-individual variability is a 
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fundamental aspect of cognitive control. He focuses on the inter-individual differences of 
the natural tendencies to engage in proactive and reactive control. Proactive control 
“reflects the sustained and anticipatory maintenance of goal-relevant information within 
lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) to enable optimal cognitive performance.”  Reactive 
control “reflects transient stimulus-driven goal reactivation that recruits lateral PFC (plus 
a wider brain network) based on interference demands or episodic associations” (Braver, 
2012, p. 106). On a surface level, two things related to temporal perspective are apparent: 
(1) the ability to regulate thoughts and actions in accordance with internally represented 
behavioral goals might be influenced by individual differences, and (2) Proactive control 
involves anticipatory maintenance of goal-relevant information, and reactive control 
involves transient stimulus-driven goal reactivation. To elaborate on (1), Braver (2012) 
mentions a number of traits, but temporal perspective, which has been shown to be a 
reliable trait over and above the big 5 and other measures of stable traits (Zimbardo & 
Boyd, 1999; Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger & Edwards, 1994) seems to be inherently 
related to “regulating thoughts and actions in accordance with internally represented 
behavioral goals.” If one is FO, she is likely to have relatively more distal future goals, 
and is likely to regulate her thoughts and actions (consciously or not) in accordance with 
these distal future goals. On the other hand, if one is present-oriented, she is likely to 
have relatively more proximal future goals, and is likely to regulate her thoughts and 
actions in accordance with these proximal future goals. To elaborate on (2), anticipatory 
maintenance of goal-relevant information seems to be inherent to maintaining distal 
goals. The assumption is that high-FO individuals are more likely to engage in proactive 
control, considering distal future goals involve maintaining goal-relevant information and 
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quelling goal-irrelevant information/behaviors. There is already some evidence that 
engaging in goal-directed future thinking engages similar executive regions that proactive 
control engages. Specifically, Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore & Schacter (2011) found that 
goal-directed future simulation engages the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and other 
executive regions. A task in which proactive control is an optimal strategy is the working 
memory task known as the Recent-probes task (RPT) (Jonides, 1998). 
 
Temporal Perspective and Strategies for Recognition Memory  
 In a pivotal study on false memories, Miller and Wolford (1999) applied signal 
detection theory (SDT) to explain the high false alarm rate seen in unstudied words that 
are highly related to lists of words in the study phase of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Whereas Roediger and McDermott explained 
the high false alarm rate of critical lures in terms of spreading activation during the time 
of encoding, Miller and Wolford emphasized a liberal criterion placement shifts for 
related words (including the critical lure) and a conservative placement shift for unrelated 
words at the time of retrieval. For example, participants are very likely to falsely respond 
“old” to sleep and dream when participants study bed, rest, awake, tired, etc. among a 
larger list of words in a study phase. They are less likely to falsely respond “old” to 
money if there are no words that relate to money in the study phase than if related words 
were presented. In SDT, the hit rate (proportion of hits/total “old” words) and the false 
alarm rate (proportion of false alarms/total “new” words) depend on two factors: (1) 
Difficulty of task: in an easy task, a high hit rate and low false alarm rate are observed 
(signal distribution and noise distribution are further apart and do not overlap much). 
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Conversely, in a difficult task, a low hit rate and high false alarm rate are observed 
(signal and noise distributions are closely aligned and overlap greatly). This parameter, 
d’, is measured by calculating the signal to “noise” ratio. A higher d’ on a task reflects 
that the test-taker was more accurate than if she had a lower d’. (2) Strategy of test taker: 
if a test-taker tends to respond with “new” to an item when she is uncertain whether the 
item was presented in the study phase or not, she is using a conservative criterion, i.e., 
she will have a low false alarm rate and low hit rate (assuming her memory is not 
perfect). If a test taker tends to respond with “old” to an item when she is uncertain if the 
item was presented in the study phase or not, she is using a liberal criterion, i.e., she will 
have a high false alarm rate and a high hit rate (Abdi 2007). The parameter, C, is 
calculated to determine the test-taker’s strategy using the hit rate and false alarm rate.  
 Using SDT, we can measure the conservativeness of one’s criterion in a given 
recognition memory task by calculating C. It has been shown that adopting a conservative 
criterion requires more strategic control than adopting a liberal criterion (Miller, Guerin 
& Wolford 2011). If FO individuals engage in more cognitive control, it is possible that 
they are more likely to adopt an overall conservative criterion when engaging in a 
recognition memory task. Aminoff et al. (2012) show that there are individual differences 
in the strategies used in placing criterion in recognition memory tasks. Considering other 
individual differences (e.g., age, sleep, cognitive style, personality) have been shown to 
predict strategies used in shifting criterion, it is plausible to explore temporal perspective 
as an individual difference that predictions criterion placement. 
 The goal of this study is to take the first step towards developing a model of temporal 
perspective that elucidates potential differences in cognitive strategies (i.e., recognition 
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memory decision making and cognitive control) that underlie the observed behavioral 
differences (i.e., academic achievement, health, overall well-being) between high-FO and 
low-FO individuals. The present study hypothesizes that high-FO participants will adopt 
an overall more conservative criterion in Miller & Wolford’s (1999) version of the DRM 
paradigm than low-FO participants. Following the recognition memory test, the link 
between temporal perspective and cognitive control will be further addressed by having 
participants perform the RPT, a working memory task that involves storage limitation 
due to proactive interference. I hypothesize that high-FO participants will perform better 





 The seventy-nine participants were recruited from University of California, Santa 
Barbara. All participants received credit to fulfill a requirement of a psychology course. 
48 were female, 31 were male. Participants’ ages range from 18 to 23, with mean age of 
19.37, and SD of 1.12.  
Design 
 The current study uses a correlational design. Participants’ temporal orientation is 
measured in order to assess the relationship between temporal orientation and cognitive 
control. Criterion placement is measured in Miller & Wolford’s (1999) version of the 
DRM paradigm and cognitive control is measured in the reaction time and proportion 
correct in the RPT. 
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Procedure 
 Participants first took a premeasure to assess participants’ temporal orientation, 
focusing only on future orientation. The premeasure consisted of questions from the 
Zimbardo Temporal Perspective Inventory (ZTPI) (future subscales only) (Zimbardo & 
Boyd, 1999) and the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scale (Strathman et 
al., 1994). These scales were chosen to measure temporal perspective due to their 
statistical validity and their popularity. Following the premeasure, participants were given 
Miller & Wolford’s (1999) version of the DRM paradigm to address susceptibility to 
false memory decisions. Participants were instructed to study the words presented on the 
screen for a memory test. Following the study phase, participants were given a 2-minute 
break without any specified task. Once the break was over, they were told they were 
taking a memory test on the words they just studied and were instructed to respond with 
either “old” or “new” to each item presented on the test phase. To confirm the 
relationship between conservative criterion and increased cognitive control, participants 
were given the RPT outlined by Jonides (1998).  
Materials 
Temporal Perspective Premeasure:  
 The premeasure consisted of questions from the ZTPI future subscale and the CFC 
scales. Participants responded to the question “How characteristic or true is this of you?" 
for each statement using a 5-point Likert scale, with anchors “Very Untrue” and “Very 
True.” Example statements from the ZTPI include, “I believe that a person’s day should 
be planned ahead each morning” and “I complete projects on time by making steady 
progress.” Example statements from the CFC scale include, “I am willing to sacrifice my 
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immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve future outcomes” and “Since my 
day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than behavior that has 
distant outcomes” (reverse-coded). The two scales were treated as a single measure. 
 
Recognition Test: Study Phase: 
 The lists of words in the study phase were broken down by categories of common 
words (e.g., Anger, Black, Bread, Chair) with highly related associated words listed in 
ascending order of relatedness (e.g., Anger: mad, fear, hate; Black: white, dark, cat; 
Bread: butter, food, eat; Chair: table, sit, legs). Each participant received 12 of the 24 lists 
originally presented in the DRM paradigm, plus 2 lists of unrelated words, generated 
from the unseen lists. Each list consisted of 15 words and they were presented at a rate of 
1.5s per word. There was a 10s break between lists. The two unrelated lists were always 
presented in the middle of the study phase. Of the 14 lists presented, there were four lists 
in which the critical lure (the word that each list item is highly related to (e.g., anger)) 
was presented, replacing the word in the first position of the list, and four lists in which 
the critical lure replaced the word in the tenth position. The remaining four lists were 
presented in its original DRM format.   
 
Recognition Test: Test Phase: 
 The recognition test comprised of 72 words. 36 were presented in the study phase. Of 
the 36 presented words, 8 were critical lures presented in the first or tenth position, 16 
were related list items presented in the first or tenth position, and 12 were unrelated items 
presented from the two unrelated lists. The remaining 36 words were not presented in the 
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study phase. Of the 36 not-presented words, 4 were critical lures from the other 12 lists in 
the DRM paradigm, 8 were related list items that were displaced when a critical lure was 
presented in its position (either first or tenth position), and 24 were unrelated items from 
the other 12 lists in the DRM paradigm. 
 
Recent-Probes Task: 
Following the paradigm outlined by Jonides (1998), participants were given 180 trials in 
which four uppercase letters appear in the center of the screen for 500ms. Following a 
fixation point presented for 1000ms, a probe is presented for 500ms as a lowercase letter. 
Any target set contains two letters drawn from the previous trial and two letters not 
presented in the last two trials. There are four types of probes: recent-positive, recent-
negative, non-recent positive, and non-recent negative. Recent-positive probes consistent 
of a letter that was presented in both the most recent trial and the trial preceding the most 
recent trial (e.g., ‘g’ was presented in trial n and trial n-1). Recent-negative probes 
consistent of a letter that was not presented in the most recent trial but was presented in 
the trial preceding the most recent trial (e.g., ‘t’ was not presented in trial n, but was 
presented in trial n-1). Non-recent positive probes consist of a letter that was presented in 
the most recent trial but was not presented in the trial preceding the most recent (e.g., ‘a’ 
was presented in trial n, but was not presented in trial n-1). Non-recent negative probes 
consist of a letter that is not presented in the most recent trial and is also not presented in 
the trial preceding the most recent (e.g., ‘p’ was not presented in trial n or trial n-1).  
 
Results 
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 Seventy-nine participants’ (48 females, 31 males) composite FO scores (consisting of 
the ZTPI future subscale and the CFC scale) were used to address temporal orientation. 
The decision to combine the scales was a result of the moderately strong correlation 
between the two scales (r=.454, p< .001). Age ranged from 18 to 23 years old (M = 19.37; 
SD = 1.12). 
 A Pearson’s r was calculated to address the hypothesis that highly future-oriented 
participants have a higher C (i.e., more conservative criterion) on the recognition memory 
test and excel at the RPT compared to participants with lower FO. Results revealed no 
significant correlations between temporal orientation and C (r = .137, p= .228), no 
significant correlations between temporal orientation and d’ (r= .011, p = .924), and no 
significant correlations between temporal orientation and the proportion of correct 
responses on the RPT (r= -.122, p= .282). There was a marginally significant weak 
correlation between future orientation and reaction time in the RPT (r= .195, p= .085). 
 
Discussion 
 The goal of this study is to elucidate cognitive control differences among high-FO 
and low-FO individuals. The first hypothesis was that high-FO participants adopt an 
overall more conservative criterion in a recognition memory test than low-FO 
participants. The correlational analyses revealed no significant correlations between 
temporal orientation and criterion placement in the recognition memory.  
 The second hypothesis was that high-FO participants would perform better (higher 
proportion correct and quicker reaction time) on the RPT than low-FO participants. No 
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significant differences were found in the proportion correct. This is likely due to the ease 
of the task employed in the experiment; therefore it remains unclear whether there is an 
inherent difference between high-FO and low-FO individuals on this task. This is a 
serious limitation of the present study, considering the overwhelming majority of 
participants performed at 90% accuracy or higher (median= .93, mean = .92, SD= .065). 
Ways to increase the difficulty of the task include degrading the stimuli so it’s harder to 
see and decreasing the stimuli presentation time. These measures should be taken in 
future experiments related to the present study. Considering that previous studies have 
demonstrated a link between future-oriented thinking and increases in working memory 
capacity I think it is reasonable to re-run the RPT controlling for ceiling effects. Baird, 
Smallwood & Schooler (2011) found a moderately strong correlation between 
participants who engage in future-oriented mind wandering and working memory 
capacity using the Operation span task. In the present study there was, however, a 
marginally significant weak correlation between temporal orientation and reaction time in 
the RPT, such that those who were higher in FO had a slower reaction time in the task. I 
am skeptical to speculate the meaning of these results because the effect is very weak to 
begin with (r= .195). 
 A follow up to the present study can address whether high-FO individuals flexibility 
adapt their criterion placement based on context more so than low-FO individuals. This 
phenomenon, known as criterion shifting, involves becoming more conservative or liberal 
in response to the shifting of the likelihood of new items presented on a recognition 
memory test. Criterion shifting has been a source of debate due to mixed results in the 
recognition memory literature. Inherent differences in individuals that lead some to shift 
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more than others may explain the mixed results (Hockley, 2011). Aminoff et al., (2012) 
identify a number of characteristics, including cognitive style, personality, age and sleep, 
which strongly influence the tendency to shift criterion in correspondence with cues that 
signal whether it is optimal to have a conservative or liberal criterion. Temporal 
perspective may contribute to understanding the differences in criterion placement and 
criterion shifting in the recognition memory literature. Future studies can implement the 
criterion shifting paradigm outlined in Aminoff et al. (2012) to assess whether temporal 
perspective is a significant contributing factor to individual differences in criterion 
shifting. This may inspire new methods for reducing false memory decisions in situations 
that rely on recognition memory, e.g., eyewitness testimonies. 
 In addition to addressing optimal criterion shifting, temporal perspective can be 
explored as a contributing factor to predicting whether an individual optimally shifts 
between proactive and reactive control strategies. One way to address this is to administer 
the RPT with blocks of trials that allow for strategic control (i.e., optimal shift between 
proactive and reactive control). Jonides (2006) outlines this task, in which blocks of trials 
are separated such that every other block is a low interference condition and the other 
half is a high interference condition. A low interference condition consists of 20% recent 
negatives probes and 80% non-recent negative probes, and 80% recent positive probes 
and 20% non-recent positive probes. The high interference condition has the reverse 
distribution of positive and negative probes. Exploring the relationship between 
individual differences in temporal perspective and optimally shifting cognitive control 
strategies may broaden the domain of Braver’s dual mechanism of control (DMC) 
framework, which proposes that intrinsic variability in cognitive control might be a result 
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of “qualitative distinctions in temporal dynamics between proactive and reactive control” 
(2012, p. 106).  In his consideration of individual variation in cognitive control, Braver 
addresses research on reward-sensitivity, threat-sensitivity and trait anxiety. Temporal 
perspective may be an important contribution to the individual differences component of 
this model, particularly considering nearly every decision a person makes involves 
consideration of the proximal or distal future. 
 In conclusion, although no significant results were derived from the present study, 
trending results provide reason to continue exploring the differences in criterion 
placement in recognition memory decision-making and overall differences in cognitive 




















RT c d' 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.122 0.195 0.137 0.011 
Sig. 0.282	   0.085 0.228 0.924 
N 79 79 79 79 
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